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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
0\VEN

rvr. COLLETI, CANTLA'{

TANZOLA, INC., and CI_JARK
TANKLINES COMPANY,
0

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Case No.

PUBLIC SERVICE C.OMMISSION
OF UTAH, R. A. GOULD~ and
LANG TRANSPORATION CORPORATION,

7279

Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is before the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari
issued January 7, 1949, .(R. 64) directing the Public Service
Commission of Utah to certify for review the record of its
proceedings in an application for transfer from one carrier
to another of a certificate of convenience and necessity for
the hauling of petroleum and petroleum products as a
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common motor carrier, or, alternatively, for cancellation
of one certificate and issuance of a new one vvithout a
showing of public convenience and necessity.
The applicants before the Commission were R. A.
Gould, a certificated carrier, and Lang Transportation C~rpora
tion, a corporation with common carrier rights in other states
and in interstate commerce.
These two had entered into
a contract ( R. 8) for the sale by Gould and purchase
by Lang of Gould's equipment, rights, and going business.
At the hearing plaintiffs and others protested the requested
relief but the Commission granted the application substantially as prayed for.
Application for stay and petition
for rehearing were filed with and denied by the Commission.
Plaintiffs sought and were denied a stay order from this
Honorable Court.
The parties will be referred to in the follovving manner:
R. A. Gould as Gould; Lang Transportation Corporation as
Lang; Cantlay & Tanzola, Inc., as Cantlay & Tanzola;
Collett Tank Lines or 0\\ren M. Collett as Collett: Clark
T anklines Company as Clark;
The Public Service Commission of Utah as The Commission.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The application of Gould and Lang (R. 1-21) alleged
that Gould was a common motor carrier of petroleum and
petroleum products intrastate in -Utah under Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity No. 784 issued by The
that Lang was a common
Commission August 27, 194 7;
motor carrier of such products under Inter-State Commerce
Commission authority; that the two had entered into an agree-
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ment ''to sell and transfer·· the operating authority of Gould:
that Lang is fit. willing. and able to perform the service; that
no hazard or burden on the highways will result from the
requested change of authority and that the transfer will be
in the public interest.
The applicants prayed that the
transfer be approved. or, alternatively, that the Gould
certificate be cancelled and a like certificate issued to Lang.
The attached agreement ( R. 8-10) provided in paragraph
I for sale of ''The certificate of public convenience and
necessity \vhich Seller ovvns and holds" for a price of
$20,000.00.
The hearing vvas protracted.
Applicants indicated
the opinion that they need show only that Lang was ''fit.
\vii ling and able'' to render the service to obtain the desired
Protestants contended
result ( R. 152, 172-173, 176).
that public convenience and necessity must be shown before
Lang could obtain the desired certificate ( R. 183, 18~).
The Commissioners . were concerned about ''Public interest''
(R. 274, 336-337, 347) and one of them talked also of
"convenience and necessity" ( R. 170, 173,347, 348, 439).
Applicants contended ''convenience and necessity was not
involved" (R. 168, 171-176, 181).
The record contains
much argument incidental to the testimony ( R. 164- 186,
303-314, 324-330, 334-339, 346-357, 447-474).
Plaintiffs concede that Lang showed that it was and
is "fit, willing and able" to operate as a common 1notor
carrier.
Testimony of adver,se effect on the public was
offered by protestants to show prospective loss of business
which, if realized, would impair services offered to the public.
No shipper witness was offered to show public convenience
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and necessity, although the witness Hurley, representing
Tidewater Associated Oil Company, testified ( R. 290-321.
392-4 17) that Lang had in other operations and could be
expected in this one to give excellent service ( R. 317).
Plaintiffs believe no worthwhile objective wouJd or
could be realized in abstracting the testimony in full and
therefore suggest hereinafter the salient features of the
testimony of each witness relating to the questions of
probable interest to this Court.
R. A. GOULD testified that he held Certificate of
Conv~nience and Necessity No. 784 (R. 153, Ex. 1, R. 66)
which he had agreed to sell or transfer to Lang (R. 156) in
the agreement, Exhibit A ( R. 68) .
He wanted the Con1mission to approve the agreement and· issue like authority to
I_Jang ( R. 161 ) .
His operating authority and good will
vvere fairly priced at $20,000 (R. 163, 186-187 ) . If the
agreement was not approved by the Commission his down
payment of $5,000 would be returned to him (R. 190).
and he vvould continue to operate the business without any
plans for expansion ( R. 199) .
If the application is denied Gould will keep his certificate and continue to work it ( R.266).
He is at a disadvantage with the larger operators who pull in a piece of
equipment when needed and do not have to sit around and
wait for something to happen ( R. 266) . Gould has been
serving the public in practically every Utah county ( R. 286).
HOWARD M. LANG is Vice-President and General
Manager of Lang (R. 202), the largest petroleum carrier
west of the Mississippi and 4th or 5th in the nation ( R. 233) .
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L.ang has assets and liabilities of $2.466.501.56 ( R. 71-72).
owns and operates 289 pieces of equipment (R. 73.205).
\\ith 9 more on order ( R. 7 l, 204-205).
Lang has a
C'ertificate from the Interstate Commerce Commission to
operate heh\'een points in Southern California and
Sou them Utah and other points ( R. 7 4.206) .
Some
equipment is registered in Utah and the Utah business
revenue has been steadily increasing over several years
(R. 207).
This revenue "vas $87,922.50 in 1943.
$127,738.48 in
1946. $146,272.59
in 1947, and
S 126,068. 10 for the first 8 months of 1948 (Ex. 8, R. 78).
Total carrier operating income for the first 8 months of
1948 \vas $2.374.727.27 (Ex. 7. R. 79-A).
If the
application. is granted Lang will lease Gould's terminal
property in Salt Lake City, employ Gould to manage its
''spread'' here, and will operate part of Gould's equipment
(R. 208). replacing the others with larger units to serve
all who call upon Lang ( R. 209) .
Now, Mr. Lang, will you explain to the
Commission, please, why it is that you undertook to
acquire the business of Gould?

"Q.

''A.

Well by this last exhibit you can see
the volumn of petroleum products that are moving
from the Southern California area into Southern
Utah. and I am sort of alarmed at our production
situation on the Coast. and I can see gasoline
probably produced here out of this new Standard Oil
refinery pushing west, and I might wind up some day
with this traffic dried up on me.
That was really
the main reason I was interested in acquiring Gould's
operation."
( R. 210-211 )
Long has an application for a Certificate of Public Con-
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enience and Necessity pending before the Commission
from a time prior to its agreement to buy Gould's business.
t"fhis will be withdrawn or dismissed if this application
is successful (R. 211.).
Gould ts now trucking for Tidewater Associated and
Standard Oil Company of California ( R. 212) .
Lang
hauls from California into Southern Utah for Standard
Oil of California, Shell Company, Texas Company,
he thinks some for Union
Tidewater Associated,
Oil Company ( R. 214-215).
If the certificate is obtained
Lang. \Vould seek to serve the companies for which it now
hauls in California and from California into Southern
Utah ( R. 216) ; is unwilling that the certificate, if granted,
$20,000 is a
be restricted to hauling into Southern Utah.
fair value for G~uld' s franchise ( R. 226);
Lang will
compete \Vith other carriers and take such business as it
can (R. 235).
EDWARD D. HURLEY of San Francisco is Chief
Rate Clerk for Tidewater Associated Oil Company ( R. 291 ) .
His company purchases products from Utq.h Oil Refinery and
distributes them through Associated Oil and Gas Company
and Mountain Oil Company ( R. 293) vis the Gould Trucking
Company ( R. 294).
Gould has rendered this service for
14 years ( R. 294).
Tidewater Associated pays the freight
for this transportation and controls the routing ( R. 298) .
His company has used Lang for transportation of petroleum
products for 25 years and has received ''very excellent
If the application is granted Tidewater
service'' ( R 316) .
Associated will continue to use Lang for intrastate
transportation in Utah ( R. 393, 406). After delivery
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of petroleum products to Associated Oil and Gas Company
in bulk, Tidewater has nothing to do \:vith further transportation or delivery (R. 403).

Tidewater has also used

the services of Cantlay & T anzola in California and Arizona
and occasionally in Utah and their services have been
satisfactory (R. 406,407).

They have utilized the services

of Collett into Idaho and that service has been satisfactory

(R.

407).

Witness is not familiar vvith the services of

Clark ( R. 406).

The reason for preferring to use Lang

"is because of a personal relationship

* *

on the coast·' and not because they are

* with them
more efficient

(R. 407).
OWEN M. COLLETT, one of the owners of Collett
Tank Lines, is operating under Utah Public Service Commission certificate of convenience and necessity No. 783

(R. 320-321, Ex. 8, R. 80).

As of June 1, 1948, Collett

operated 70 pieces of equipment (Ex. 9, R. 82) and has
discontinued 10 of those since that date because of loss of
traffic due

to Cantlay & T anzola' s obtaining

authority into Idaho ( R.
appears on

Ex.

liabilities are $334,993.48

(This loss of traffic

323).

10, R. 84.)

interstate

Collett's total assets and

(Ex·.

11,

R.

85).

Loss of

a substantial amount of business would materially affect
his business and granting of the application would probably
result in substantial loss of intrastate business ( R. 332,333,
341. 342, 358).

During 1948 Collett has had idle equip-

ment. averaging about 10 units, in addition to the 10 that
were

cut off ( R. 358) .

Loss of traffic and revenue
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cause curtailment of services, reduction of personnel, and
delays in serving the public who are the shippers and
eventual diminution of equipment and of ability to render
service.

T errninal expense is made excessive and pressure

for increased rates gets stronger ( R. 359-362) .

Truck

rates in Utah are 20% under rail, while in states to the
east and north they are the same as or 20% more than rail
( R. 362-363).

At the time of Ex Parte 166, states to

the east and north of Utah took increases in motor carrier
rates and Utah took none (R. 363,365).

Collett ~as

giving shippers one and two hour service for shipments
moving up to 100 miles during 1948 up to June, with 24
hours per day dispatching service.

Since June personnel

has been cut and service has been cut to about six hours.
This is better service than is given in any of the surrounding
states where most carriers give service of from 24 and 36
hours to as high as 3 or 4 days.

The keen competition in

Utah is the reason for the service given (R. 365-366).
Collett is seeking new business and expanded territory to
keep present equipment busy ( R. 367).

There is a place

and a need for small equipment in serving Utah intrastate
business

( R.

368) .

If

additional

business, such as

Associated Oil, or Shell Petroleum, were tendered, Collett
could handle it ( R. 369) .

Documents marked Exhibit 12

are reports of the State Tax Commission ( R. 86-125)
showing gasoline refined in, imported to, exported from,
and consumed in Utah by months from June, 1946, to
May, 1948, with some months missing as follows:
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Month

Refined
In Utah

Imports

Consumed
Exports
In Utah

June

1946

14,476.733

3,610,430

4.068,774

13,642.141

September

1946

16.019.949

3,392,646

4,115.192

13,980,591

October

15,409,750

3,352,567

4,275,269

13,401,097

November

14.398.169

3,071,468

3,116,771

11,750,415

December

14,532.783

3,077,418

3,345,639

11,617,556

14,452,111

2,997,625

3,078,728

11,099,977

February

13,810,513

2.669,318

3,126,097

10,363,305

rvtarch

14,007,955

2,446,941

4,039,798

12,123,267

April

13,779,519

2.671,483

4,681,967

13,064,868

May

17,523,031

2,784;901

4,853,681

13,925,940

July

17,021,861

3,110,019

6,446,528

17,233,922

August

17,918,774

3,115,255

6,580,704

16,893,193

September

15,897,642

2,939,365

5,980,956

16,261,613

November

18.925,279

1,990,412

3,578,845

12,477,233

December

14,858,737

1,899,874

4,066,294

13,041,776

16,564,828

2,116,682

3,662,680

12,225,217

February

15,827,252

2.014,209

3,028,254

10,855,306

March

12,775,668

1,894,763

4,132,271

12,966,404

April

17,001,576

2,356,824

4,885,143

14.675,523

May

19,257,105

2,810,957

5,704,448

15.142,606

January

January

1947

1948
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Imports into·· Utah by the companies ~erved by Lang
into Southern Utah.· (R. 214-215) taken from Exhibit 12
are as follows:
Standard Oil
Oalifomia
Shell

Month
June

1946

Union
Texas

Oil

621.145

328,238

165,611

21,130

September

612,402

285,183

165,856

27,7'14

October

455,235

275,066

149,358

7,094

November

402,522

186,731

99,035

oo.oop

December

367,870

209,305

80,932

00.000

261,315

154,284

69,032

00,000

February

327,019

182,022

60,780

6,938

March

242,310

180,457

70,801

00,000

Ap~il

385,501

277,125

98,168

00,000

May

204,317

355,461

56,360

20,900

July

780,067

372,867

18,666

48,395

August

.

546,937

363,416

19,915

50,702

September

303,338

924.760

20,965

27,531

November

113,507

194,333

56,410

00,000

December

88,109

198.278

8,145

00,000

99,576

150,969

8,849

7,029

February

76,810

271,447

9,215

00,000

March

95,350

153,146

12,616

00,000

127,410

212,443

18,873

20. t 18

108,1 10

376,793

15,916

30,361

January

January

April
May

1947

1948

''

(These reports show no imports
or Associated Oil. )

by Tidewater Associated
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The equipment of Gould. Clark. Cantlay & T anzola.
and Collett is more than adequate for the. transportation
There is keen comneeds in this state ( R. 373-374).
petition between the petroleum carriers in Utah (R. 374).
Collett's intrastate traffic for the first eight months
of 1948 \VaS probably 1Q% higher than for the corresponding
Gould has been operating longer
period of 1947 ( R. 378).
than Collett and in 1947 had $89~000 gross revenue
compared with Collett's $800.000
including interstate
commerce.
Collett's intrastate gross revenue was
$9o.ooo (R. 381).
Collett's ratio of earnings to gross revenue was 5%
in 1947 compared to 11% in 1948.
The increase was
because the volume was up ( R. 386) .
And when the
volume dropped in 1948 the profit dropped better than
half (R. 387).
If this application should be ·granted it is Collett's
opinion he would lose tO% of Texas Company and Standard Oil Company business, which together represent 85%
of his intrastate business ( R. 527).
Motor carriers ar~
presently benefiting from the railroad's inability to handle
petroleum because of shortage of tank cars ( R. 528) .
R. M. BRYAN is Utah and Idaho manager for
Cantlay & T anzola which operates under Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity No. 785 (R. 418-419, Ex.
15, R. 126).
The company has been in business since
1929 and has interstate as well . as intrastate authority in
California, Arizona, and Nevada ( R. 421 ) .
They have
a large. modern terminal in Salt Lake City where all
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general maintenance work and complete repair work is done
(R. 421-423, Ex. 16, R. 131).
They maintain 15
mechanics and 24-hour dispatch service. and have 26 power·
units (of which 9 are used in the Idaho business ( R. 521 ) )
and 27 trailers stationed at Salt Lake City ( R. 423-424, Ex.
17, R. 132) .
The equipment has special features for use
on Utah Highways (R. 427).
They have idle equipment
They
quite regularly and could handle additional traffic.
now serve all types of customers throughout the state ( R:
428) .
They hauled 35,705,231 gallons of petroleum
products intrastate in Utah in 194 7 (Ex. 19, R. 134) , and
in the first six months of 1948 hauled 18,255,825 with
Total
gross revenue of $ 198,985.98 ( R. 135, Ex. 20) .
assets and liabilities are $1,365.274.35 (R. 433, Ex. 21.
R. 136). Volume of traffic for July 1948 was approximately 125,000 gallons less than for July 1947.
They serve from 75 to 85 points in Utah ( R. 435}.
Should additional equipment be needed in Utah, the company can supply it.
They are handling all business
tendered and have never been compelled to refuse traffic
(R. 437). · Cantlay & Tanzola serves the same companies
in Utah that Lang serves into Southern Utah interstate
(R. 441).
The carriers in Utah are actively soliciting new business
Loss of business reduces the load factor
in Utah ( R. 453).
on equipment, increases overhead in proportion to revenue
and thus reduces the power to serve the public ( R. 440) .
This increase of costs compels rate increases to give a stable
operation in a satisfactory manner (R. 441).
The increase in business the first six months of 1948
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compared with the first six months of 1947 "vas approximately four million gallons and V\'as due to increase in
the fuel oil business ( R. 481-482).
Increasing intrastate
business in 1948 was due to shortage of railroad tank cars
as compared with 1947 (R. 486-487).
The equipment of Cantlay & T anzola, Collett, and
Clark, could handle all the gallonage being hauled by
them and by Gould and render good serVice to the public
His con1pany and Collett could each carry 25
( R. 523).
to 30 per cent more gallonage than they are hauling and
Clark could carry 50% more ( R. 524).
BOYCE R. CLARK is manager of Clark T anklines
Company, operating under Certificate of Convenience and
Necessity No. 786, with 26 pieces of equipment (R. 488490, Ex. 22, 23, R. 138-140).
Total assets and liabilities are $136,892.39 (R. 141).
Clark now has idle
equipment and is soliciting new business amongst keen competition ( R. 492).
Clark could haul 125,000 gallons a
day if it were available ( R. 493) .
If Clark loses business because of additional competition. it would put them in ''a very unsound financial
position" after having bought some new equipment, because
of increasing proportionate overhead costs ( R. 502,504).
This would affect their ability to serve the public because
of inability to keep crews and equipment busy ( R. 504).
Truck rates have not increased lately in Utah and are 20%
under rail ( R. 505) .

ly

Clark has purchased two neV\' trucks and trailers recentalthough they had idle equipment at the time ( R. 509-
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5 10) .
If Lang were given a certificate it would take
some of Clark's business, such as from the Utah Oil account
(R. 511).

The Report and Order of the Commission were issued
December 16, 1948 (R. 40-50).
The report consists largely of an argument and justification for cancelling one certificate and issuing a like certificate
to Lang in the absence of a showing of convenience and necessity. References to the general qualifications of the two
applicants are included and it is found that Lang is financially
responsible, fit, willing and able to operate as a common
rnotor carrier ~nd that it will comply with the laws of the
State of Utah and not burden the highways unduly (R.
44).
The report also discusses the public interest as it
would be affected by the claim of protestants that the
entry of Lang into Utah intrastate commerce would adversely affect them and impair the service which they <:auld
render to the ·public.
The Commission was not satisfied
v.;ith this testimony and found that the public interest
would not be adversely affected ( R. 45-46).
On the question of public convenience and necessity
the report of the Commission states:
''In Case No. 2882 heretofore heard, being
the application of R. A. Gould, this Commission found and determined that public convenience and necessity required the rendering of
service by Gould as in said application prayed,
and pursuant to its report in said case made.
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issued to Gould. on or about the 27th day of
August. 1947, Certificate of Conveyance and Necessity No. 784, authorizing Gould to operate
as a common motor carrier for the transportation
of petroleum and petroleum products. except road
oil and asphalt. in bulk. between Salt Lake
Citv and \Voods Cross on one hand and all
oth~r points and places in the State of Utah on
the other ( R. 4 1) .
"On or about said 27th day of August. 1947,
in other cases then pending. this Commission
issued further certificates of convenience and
necessity as follo\\'S:
(Refers to Certificates No.
783. 785, 78b and 834.)
(R. 41)

*

**

''This Commission in said cases found and
determined that public convenience and necessity required the services of each and all of said
carriers as in said certificates authorized and
prescribed.
Such finding and determination is
now final and absolute in each of said cases,
and no contention by any party to this proceeding
is no\v made that public convenience and necessity
do not continue to require the rendering of the
service as in said certificates ordered and authorized bv each of the holders thereof, and each of
said ~ertificates, including the Applicant Gould,
has since the issuance thereof continued and now
continues to exercise the rights and perform the
service in said respective certificates authorized
and to discharge his or its duty to the public
thereunder.
( R. 42)
''The motor cnrrier rules and regulations of
this Commission no"'' in force and effect preclude
transfer from one carrier to another of operating
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authority and require that the certificate of convenience and necessity of the retiring carrier be
cancelled and annulled and that a new certificate
of convenience and necessity with like auth~rity
be issued to the carrier who undertakes the performance of the service. If the transaction herein
proposed be authorized by this Commission. it
must be carried out pursuant to such procedure.

(R. 43)
''The contention was made at the hearing
and in their briefs by certain parties protestant
that i\pplicants were under the duty of showing
in this case that public convenience and necessity
now require the service sought in this case to be
rendered by Lang.
As hereinabove shovvn. this
Commission has determined in a prior proceeding
that public convenience and necessity require the
services which Gould is authorized to perform
under said Certificate No. 784.
Lang proposes
simply that he may be authorized to enjoy the
rights and discharge the · obligations and duties
of Gould.
Lang seeks the right to perform
those services which Gould is presently authorized to perform, nothing more.
It having been
determined by this Commission that public cqnvenience and necessity require such services. that
question is not an issue in this case and need not
again be determined.
The motor carrier rules
and regulations of this Commission now and
since June 1. 1937. in force and effect so provide:
and the procedure of this Commission in cases
such as this has been consistently in accordance
therewith."
( R. 44)

The

order of the Commission simply issues a certificate
to Lang and cancels the certificate of Gould and fixes
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a time for the effectuation of' the order ( R. 48-49).
Notice of consummation of the transaction was filed with
the Commission December 23. 1948 ( R. 51 ) and application for rehearing and for suspension of order was filed
December 27. 1948 ( R. 52-56).
The order denying
application for rehearing and for suspension of order was
dated December 30, 1948 ( R. 57).
Petition for writ of
certiorari and for supersedeas was filed in this court
January 5, 1949, (R. 59-63) and writ of certiorari was
issued J~nuary 7, 1949.
The court subsequently denied
the application for supersedeas and the record of the
Commission \vas filed in this court March 22, 1949.

STATEtviENT OF ERRORS RELIED ON
Plaintiffs rely upon the follovving propositions as
constituting error in the decision of the Commission.

I. A Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
issued by the Public Service Commission of Utah is not
a property right and cannot be transferred without the
approval of The Commission.
II. The Public Service Commission of Utah has no
authority to transfer a Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity in the · absence of a showing of public convenience and necessity.
Ill. The Public Service Commission of Utah cannot
take judicial notice of the existence of public convenience
nnd necessity based upon evidence at a prior hearing in
another case.
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ARGUMENT
I.

A CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND
NECESSITY ISSUED BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF UTAH IS NOT A PROPERTY RIGHT AND CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED ~THOUT THE APPROVAL OF
THE COMMISSION.
l t is doubtful that defendants Lang and Gould contend
anything contrary to this statement.
In answer to a
question of Commissioner Carlson, Mr. Cornwall stated
that he assumed the transfer could not be made:
''We assume that under the regulations of
this Commission, that the holder of that certificate enjoys sorne property right in that operating
authority; that if the Commission is satisfied that
the Lang Transportation Corporation vvill exercise
those rights and render like service to the public.
that the Commission will cancel the authority of
Mr. Gould and issue like authority to the Lang
Transportation Corporation.''
( R. 158).
The consideration of $20,000 for the operating
authority suggests that both the applicants thought Gould
had sornething to sell, and if this Court approves this
transfer the certificate issued by the Commission in discharge o·f a governmental function will be given real
monetary value.
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In Effenberger v. Marconnit. 135 Neb. 558, 283 N.W.
223, 224. a case involving an attempted assignment through
the power of the

district court, the Supreme Court of

Nebraska said:

"In Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission. 155 N.E. 694, the court in
discussing the nature of a certificate of convenience and necessity said (Page 696) :
'· 'This court has repeatedly declared that
a certificate of convenience and necessity, issued
by the Public Utilities Commission to the motor
transportation company is not a franchise, and
that the holder of such certificate does not thereby acquire a property right in the route covered
by such certificate; that the issuing of said certificate is authorized only for the purpose of promoting the public convenience and necessity and
not for the purpose of conferring upon the holder
of such certificate any proprietary interest or
franchise in the public highways; that the purpose in limiting the number of certificates that
may be granted over the same route is to promote
the public convenience and necessity by restricting
the number of buses to the needs of the public,
and thus occasion as little inconvenience as
possible to the public using the highway in the
usual and ordinary \vay, and to insure to the
holder of the certificate such immunity from competition as vvill enable him to serve the public
convenience and necessity by regular, continuous
public service; any certificate of convenience and
necessity is in the nature of a revokable personal
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permit and has not the attributes of a property
right.'
''The distinction between a franchise and · a
certificate of convenience and necessity is aptly
made in Re. St. Johns Riverline Company,
7 P.U.R., N.S., 268, as follows:
'' 'A certificate of public convenience and
necessity, however, is distinctly different from the
grant of a franchise to use and occupy streets.
The franchise to use and occupy streets is a grant
of a public right for the use of public streets
while a certificate of public convenience and
necessity is stricti y a regulatory measure, and the
granting or witholding of a certificate is an exercise of the power of the state to determine
whether the rights and interests of the general
public will be advanced by the prosecution of
the enterprise which it is proposed to carry on for
the service of the public.'

***

''We necessarily conclude that a certificate
of convenience and necessity is in the nature of
a pe~it or license and that it is not property in
any legal or constitutional sense.
It is a mere
license that can be amended or revoked by the
power authorized to issue it.
Such being the
case, it is personal in its character, is not transferIt is
able and does not pass by succession.
purely a regulatory measure that can vest no
property right in the holder. - - An attempt on
the part of the district court to do so is without
legal sanction.''
To the same effect is Gilmer v. Public Utilities Commission, 67 Utah 222, at 235, 247 P. 284.
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II.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
HAS NO AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER A
CERTIFICATE OF . PUBLIC CONVENIENCE ANIJ
NECESSITY IN THE ABSENCE OF A SHOWING
OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY.
The Commission is a creature of the legislature and
has only such po'.-vers as have been granted to it.
In
Bamberger Electric Railroad Company v. Public Utilities
Commission, 59 Utah 351, 364, 204 P. 314, 320, this
court rules:
''It needs no citation of authorities that where
a specific power is conferred by a statute upon a
tribunaL board or commission with limited/ powers,
the powers are limited to such as are specifically
mentioned.
Any other rule would make an
autocrat of the utilities commission.''
This was confirmed in Union Pacific Railroad Company
v. Public Service Commission, 103 Utah 186, 134 P.2d 469,
474.
Recognizing, then, that there can be no implied author"'"
ity to the Public Service Commission, it becomes necessary
to determine if there has been an express grant of authority by the legislature to the Commission which would
permit them to allow a transfer or sale of a certificate of
convenience and necessity, as was attempted in this case.
Title 76, Chapter 5, of the Utah Code Annotated,
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194 3, deals generally with motor transport corporations.
Section 20 of that chapter provides as follows:

"No common motor carrier authorized by
this act to operate shall abandon or discontinue
any service established under the provisions of
this act without an order of the commission.''
Section 32 provides:
''Certificates, permits and licenses heretofore
issued to any common or contract motor carrier
by the commission shall remain in effect, but
such carrier shall comply in all other respects
vdth the provisions of this act.''
Section 33 is as follows:
''The commission may at any time for good
cause, and after notice and hearing, suspend. alter,
amend or revoke any certificate, permit or license
issued by it hereunder.''
The above-mentioned powers were all in the act as
passed by the 1935 legislature as Chapter 65 and evidenced
a complete consideration of what may or may not be done
with a certificate, permit or license issued by the commission.
It will be noticed that there is no comment concerning a
transfer of such rights.
In 1941, however, Title 76,
Chapter 5, Section 40 vvas added to the title by an amendment, which provides for a ''transfer of operating rights of
deceased owner." In view of this provision it is clear that
the issue of transferring certificates was brought before the
legislature and specifically considered by it.
Also equally
clear is the fact that after such consideration the legislature
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felt that the only time when a transfer should be permitted
is in the event of death of an operating owner.
This
theory of statutory construction \vas adopted at an early
date, 1894, by our Supreme Court in Pettie v. Duke, 10
Utah 311, 317, 37 P. 568, \Yherein this statement is made:
''It is a \veil established rule of construction
that \vhere a statute grants a power or right
the powers not mentioned in the enumeration are
intended to be excluded. Suth. St. Canst. Sec.
325.
In the language of the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of United States
v. Arredondo. 6 Pet. 725. 'expressio unis est exclusio
alterius', is a universal maxim in the construction
of statute.''
This theory of construction was re-affirmed in 1936 in
Utah Rapid Transit Company v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546,
551, 58 P. 2nd 1, wherein this statement is made.

·'It is one of the well recognized cannons of
statutory construction that \vhen a statute directs
a thing rna y be done by a specific means or in a
particular manner it may not be done by other
means or in a different manner.
The familiar
maxim,
'expressio unis est exclusio alterius', is
especially applicable in the construction of a
statute.''
{Fallowed by citation to numerous
authorities.)
Also. see Hansen v. Board of Education, 101 Utah
15, 25. 116 P. 2nd 936.
The general rule applicable here is stated by Pond
on Public Utilities, Th·ird Edition, Section 450, under a
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section entitled, ''Legislative authority must be express to
permit transfer'':
''In the absence of express statutory authority
a sale and transfer of public utility property and
franchise rights is not valid, for, as the court in
the case of People v. Commercial Tel. & Tel.
Co., 277 Ill. 265, 115 N. E. 379, L. R. A.
19170. 704. P. U. R. 19170. 272. says:
'It
is no~' settled by an overwhelming weight of
authority that publ-ic or quasi public corporations,
such as gas companies, water companies, electric
companies, telegraph and telephone companies,
raih~'ay companies, and all silnilar corporations
which owe duties to the public as well as to
their stockholders, have no right to transfer their
corporate po'Arers and prtvileges, and thereby disable themselves from performing their public
duties, without legislative authority, 12 R.C.L.
217, 3 Thompson on Corporations, Sec. 2906; 37
Cyc. 1616; Cumberland Telephone Co. v. City
of Evansville (C.C.), 127 Fed. 18, 3 Cook on
Corporations, Sec. 941; Attorney-General v.
Haverhill Gaslight C·o., 215 Mass. 394, 101 N. E.
1061, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1266, and notes;
Brunswick Gaslight Co. v. United Gas Co.
85 Me. 532. 27 Atl. 525. 35 Am. St. Rep. 385.
and notes; Thomas v. West Jersey Railroad Co.,
101 U.S. 71, 25 L. Ed. 950; Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., .139 U.S.
24, 11 S. Ct. 478, 35 L.Ed. 55.
The grant
in the ordinance to the Westfall Telephone
Company was to it alone, and not to it and its
successors and assigns, and there were no words
used in the grant signifying that its successors or
assigns could succeed to the rights of the
Westfall Telephone Company.
The grant was

** *
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therefore not assignable as the statutes of our
state do not expressly authorize such a transfer.''
See also cases under Point I of this brief.
Cases under the Interstate Commerce Commission's
jurisdiction are of no value as precedents, because the
statute there specifically permits the transfer.
Section 212
(b) ~f the Interstate Commerce Act provides in part:
'·except as provided in Section 5 any
certificate or permit may be transferred, pursuant
to such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe.''
1

Rule 2 (b) published by the Interstate Commerce
Commission permits transfer if the transferee is shown to
be "fit, willing and able to properly perform the service"
Section 213 has been
and if Section 213 is satisfied.
repealed and Section 5 governs both as to rail and motor
carriers and permits acquisitions and transfers subject to a
determination of ''the public interest''.
It is true that the Commission promulgated a rule permitting a transfer without proving c~nvenience and ,necessity
(Motor Carrier Rules and Regulations No. 3, effective
June 1, 1937, page 5, Rule II) but the promulgation of a
rule cannot create or establish power or authority not delegated by the I_Jegislature.
In State v. Goss, 79 Utah 559,
II P.2d 340 at 342-343, this Court was interpreting a
statute granting powers to the State Board of Health wherein there was said:
''And shall have authority to make such rules and
regulations not contrary to the Iavv as may be
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deemed necessary for the preservation of public
health."
and this Court held:
''The general power to make rules and
regulations, unlimited except that they shall not
be contrary to law, is coextensive with the state
police power as it affects public health.
We
think it clear that under this general language the
state board of health is not empowered to pass
rules and regulations having the force· of law
regulating the conduct of the people of the state
with respect to all matters having some relation
to the public health.
This, indeed, would be
the delegation of legislative power if the words,
of the statute should be so construed.
The
language must be taken to be limited to the
particular matters and things specified in succeeding sections of the statute wherein duties are
imposed upon the state board of health with
respect to particular subjects or situations with
respect to the public health.''
That authority and power cannot be dra\vn from
broad statements concerning the purpose and function of
the commission is we II shown in the case of Hansen v.
Board of Education, supra, page 25 of 101 Utah,
wherein this statement is made:
"The blanket provision that it 'may do all
things needful for the maintenance, prosperity
and success of the schools and the promotion of
education' does not enlarge the po'A'ers specifically conferred.''
However, the plaintiffs' case need not rest on this rule
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of construction. alone.
La"vs of Utah. 1927. chapter 42.
section 7. later known as Title 76. Chapter 5, Section 5.
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, provided as follows:
''No permits granted under this title shall
be assignable except with the consent, after
hearing. of the Public Utilities Commission.''
This chapter of the la\v was repealed by Laws of
1933, Chapter 53. Section 35, which was repealed by Laws
of 1935. Chapter 65, Section 26, and in neither of these
~ subsequent acts was this transfer provision incorporated into
the law.
From this legislative history it is quite obvious
that the legislature intended that no power to approve a
transfer or sale of a certificate of convenience and necessity
should exist in the Public Service Commission or otherwise,
except that in 194 1 transfers in the event of death were
provided for.

It is worthwhile to notice also that the Public Utilities
Commission of Utah promulgated rules and regulations
effective July 6, 1933, and designed to carry out Chapter
53 of the Session Laws of Utah. 1933, Rule 1 (c) of
\vhich was as follows:
"Certificates of convenience and necessity
are not transferable or assignable.''
Thereafter, as above noted, Chapter 53 of the ·Laws
of 1933 was repealed by Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935,
although the section requiring certificate of convenience and
necessity (Section 6) was identical insofar as here pertinent
\vith Section 7 of Chapter 53. Lavvs of 1933.
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It therefore appears that without any legislative authorization or change in applicable statutory authority the
Commission simply decided it would approve the transfer
of certificates by the device in Rule ·II of Motor Carrier
Rules and Regulations No. 3, above referred to.
Section
(c) of this rule follows the earlier rules:
''Certificates of convenience and necessity
are not transferable or assignable.''
But Section (d) goes into a nevv idea and permits a carrier
to enter into an agreement with another person to transfer
his operating rights and file a joint application for one to
discontinue his operations and for the other to assume and
take over the operations, and ends vvith this provision:.
''The person desiring to assume said operating rights shall comply with the provisions of
Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 19.35, as in filing
for a ne\v certificate of convenience and necessity
except that said person will not be required to
prove convenience and necessity.~'
ln establishing such a rule the Commission \vent back to
the statutory authorization which existed between 1.927 ·
and 1933 and in effect authorized transfers of operating
authority without showing of convenience and necessity
after the authority to permit such transfers had been repealed by the legislature.
Not until 1941, when transfers
in the event of deceased ovvners \vas pennitted by the
legislature, did any statute hark back to the rule of 1927
laws which permitted assignments.
On this question olso the Court has previously spokrn
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in a case where the legislative background was parallel.
Hansen v. Board of Education of Emery County School
District, 101 Utah 15, 25-26, 116 P.2d 936.
''We have heretofore quoted the statutes
that vested powers in the Board of Education of
county school districts to 'change or discontinue'
and sho\vn that this provision or grant of power
A power once
was later taken away. * *
granted by the legislature and then withdrawn,
does not leave the matter of invoking the principle
of implied power open for consideration.
In re
Phillips' Estate, 193 Wash. 194, 74 P. 2d 101-5;
. Ogden City v. Gilbert F. Boreman, 20 Utah 98,
57 P. 843.

*

''The legislature has not amended the law to
vest boards of education with the power to
'change and discontinue' but has expressly withdrawn such powers after the power was once given.
We find nothing in the statutes showing the
legislature had the intention to vest in the boards
of education or the successors of the boards of
trustees the power vested in the old boards of
trustees, i.e., to change or discontinue schools in
county school districts.''
Section 76-5-18, U.C.A., 1943, requires a sho~ing of
public convenience and necessity before a certificate can be
granted.
The Commission has no authority to waive the
requirement.
76-5-19 provides for notice to interested
parties, for a hearing and the submission of evidence, and:
''If the commission finds from the evidence
that the public convenience and necessity require
the proposed service or any part thereof it may
issue the certificate as prayed for

* * * .''
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Without such finding from the evidence submitted the
Commission cannot issue a certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity.

III.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE
EXISTENCE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND
NECESSITY BASED UPON EVIDENCE AT A
PRIOR HEARING IN ANOTHER CASE.
The applicants, who are defendants here, have been uncertain of their position in this proceeding.
They have proclaimed that they need only show that Lang is fit, willing
and able to operate satisfactorily to entitle them to their
transfer and yet have been unable to resist doing lip service
to the public convenience and necessity requirement.
In his opening statement Mr. Cornwall said:
''Inasmuch as the applicant Lang is simply
acquiring the operating rights of Gould, it is our
-position in this proceeding, of course, that public
convenience and necessity is not an issue and not
It is simply ~a question as to whether
involved.
the Commission \\'iII approve the transfer and
whether Lang is in a position to render the service
to the public which Gould has heretofore and is
novv rendering.'' ( R. 152)
A little later Mr. Berol argued:
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"Under this application a new ca(rier or a
new applicant \tvill merely continue to pr,ovide
the same service Gould is and has been providing. Therefore. the degree of proof is less than
if it was a new applicant. and. under the Statute.
it is my view that the only proof that is required here is that the applicant, the Lang
Transportation Corporation is financially able to
continue to perform the services Gould has heretofore performed.
"In other words. there will be nq additional
burden on the highway. there will be no new and
additional service other than that which exists
today.
Therefore, if I read the Statute correctly, the showing to be made here is that the new
applicant that is proposing to be substituted in
lieu of the service provided by Gould, is willi~g
and able and financially responsible to provide
( R. 172-173}
the service that is proposed.''
And again. Mr. Berol urged:
"Therefore, as I see it, under these circumstances, the degree of the proof that your Cornmission should require is fitness, ability, and financial ability of the applicant that proposes to
substitute his service for the service your Cornmission has already found is in the public
interest.''
( R. 176)
But at the same time the applicants were trying to
hurdle the public convenience and necessity hurdle without
producing the testimony of convenience and necessity which
is noticeably absent from the record.
Thus, Mr. Cornwall
advised Commissioner Carlson:
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"Well, of course, Mr. Commissioner, in
this case we are not now dealing with the question
in the first instance as to whether public convenience and necessity requires the operation.
That the Commission has heard and passed upon.
They have determined that public convenience
and necessity requires that Mr. Gould here, for
instance, should perform this service.
We are
not now reopening that issue.
''The only question that we are concerned
with today is whether the I?erson whom he proposes shall be substituted in his stead is in a position to discharge that duty to the public.
That
is all that we are here concerned with today."
(R. 168-169)
And Mr. Berol suggested:
"We have, at the present time, a carrier,
Gould. who is serving the public under a certificate heretofore issued by this Commission.
This
Commission has heretofore decided that public
convenience and necessity requires that service.
Based on that decision, Gould has been providing
and performing that service.
That service is now
All that is being proavailable to the public.
--posed here, under the alternative part of the application is that Gould discontinue.
In other words,
that his certificate be revoked, which the Statute
clearly authorizes you to do, and that in his place
and stead a new certificate be issued to the Lang
Transportation Corporation, again which the Statute clearly authorizes you to do.
"Now, that leaves a question as to the degree
of proof, and I submit here that applicants under
this condition, or this Commission, is not put.
under the statute, to the same degree of proof as
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though a new applicant \Vere seeking to enter the
field, and the reason for that is that Gould is
in the field, and the Commission had found that
public convenience and necessity requires his
service.
He is providing that service for the
(R. 171-172)
public."
(Mr. Berol neglected to point out the statutes which
"clearly authorize" the Commission to do as requested.)
And so the applicants chose to offer no testimony
whatever of public convenience and necessity and, as Chairman Hacking said, failed "to put in a full fledged case on
convenience and necessity''.
( R. 181 )
When the Report and Order were prepared applicants '
exhibited the same attitude:
unwillingness to risk absence
of convenience and necessity and yet realization that they
were without any proof of it.
And so they asked the ,
Commission to accept public convenience and necessity as
already demonstrated by reason of the existence of a carrier
with a certificate (R. 41, 42, 44).
The protestants, who are now plaintiff_s, took the
position that public convenience and necessity must be
shown and put in complete evidence of their idle equipment.
their efficient service, their efforts to obtain nevv b~siness,
and their ability to handle all the traffic \vithout either
Gould or Lang.
This position was plainly stated
(R. 183, 184) and uniformly pursued.
Is the fact that the Commission had previously issued
Certificate 784 to Gould enough to establish public convenience and necessity for Lang7
Oertificate 784
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(Ex. 1. R. 66) was issued August 27~ 1947. There is no
showing of when the hearing was held pursuant to which
the .certificate was issued and no suggestion that conditions
were unchanged.
In this hearing the protestants testified
to their ability to serve the public and the equipment they
had acquired.
Where were the shippers who shovv the
It must be assumed that they are satisfied
public need?
and could not testify to a need.
The witness Hurley
represented a shipper and said his company preferred Lang for
personal reasons ( R. 407) but admitted that Collett and
Cantlay & Tanzola had served him well and could again
(R. 406, 407).
Exhibit 12 shovvs a fluctuating picture of gasoline
transportation in Utah, even without the impact of production from the two new refineries in North Salt Lake,
one of which is no\v in operation.
On Pages 11 and 12 this
exhibit is abstracted and shows steady reduction of imports
and increase of exports, and since more is exported than
imported there is little place for increased intrastate business
and no need for Lang \vho wants to expand, as against
Gould who, if the transfer is denied, will continue to operate
his business without any plan for expansion ( R. 199).
And this study further shows that the companies for
whom Lang hauls into Southern Utah have been steadily
decreasing their imports and increasing their purchases in
Utah, so that Lang must look elsewhere for business and
seeks to start with Gould's operation and expand it.
It is notable also that Lang has an application for
certificate of public convenience and necessity pending and
chooses to short-cut the required showing by buying in
( R. 211).
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All · of this shows that Lang does not seek Gould's
operation, but Gould's certificate so as to permit an expansion for which there is no public necessity. Factually.
the case is akin to that of the carrier in Gilmer v. Public
Utilities Commission. 67 Utah 222, 247 P. 284.
This was a case \vhere Joseph Carling had operated a
stage· prior to passage of the Public Utilities Act.
He
obtained a certificate of convenience and necessity to
operate the · automobile stage
line.
He inaugurated
weekly trips in each direction and in 1924 filed a joint
application with T. M. Gilmer to transfer the certificate.
The old certificate \vas cancelled and a new one issued to
T. M. Gilmer \vho proceeded to operate.
Gilmer filed
a schedule of rates for daily service · vvhich was suspended
"until upon a proper showing made before the commission
that public convenience and necessity require such additio~al service".
Gilmer contended that no approval vvas
required, and that the certificate of transfer limiting service
to that given by Carling \vas beyond the Commission's
authority.
The Commission affirmed the suspension and
it was upheld by the Supreme Oourt on writ of review.
The question of the right to transfer was not before
the court in the Gilmer case.
It vvas under an earlier
statute (Sec. 4818, C.L.U. 1917) which required a
certificate only for one desiring to "begin" operations as
~ carrier.
But after the transfer was accomplished and
the new carrier showed that he wanted to expand by
making daily rather than weekly runs, he was compelled to
face the test of public convenience and necessity.
Lang
should face the same test, since it is not willing to be
limited to Gould's operations.
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By gIossing over the question of convenience and
necessity applicants are seeking the benefit of. evidence at
a prior hearing, involving different parties, at a remote time
and in a different kind of hearing.
The Commission in
so doing was not acting on the evidence submitted. as required by 76-5-19, U.C.A., 1943.
In Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, 107 Utah 155, 209-210, 152 P. 2d 542, 567, this
Court makes the following extended comment concerning such
conduct by the Public Service C:ommission:
"This brings us to a further specification
of error urged by the company. The Commission
throughout its report has made several references
to matters \vhich cannot be verified from any
matters in the records which were certified to
this court.
The matters to which the Commission thus alluded went beyond the mere
references to other reports and decisions.
For
example, in regard to the discussion of post-war
electrical revenues, the Commission referred to
testimony of Mr. Gadsby in another case
(No. 2652) \\'hich was pending before the Coml'1r. Gadsby
mission at about this same time.
had no opportunity at this hearing to explain
this testimony to show why it would not be
applicable to the various situations involved in
this case or to deny the conclusions which the
Commjssion dre\v from it.
Such references to
matters \vhich the Company has had no opportunity to explain or rebut certainly cannot be
commended.
''In Los Angeles & Salt L.ake Railroad Co.
v. Public Utilities Commission, 81 Utah 286. 17
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P. 2d 287. 290, a similar point was raised.
The question before the Commission was whether
a railroad could be permitted to discontinue
maintaining a station agent at Faust. Utah. without impairment of the services \vhich the law required it to furnish to the public.
At this
hearing no evidence was taken regarding the needs
of various sheepmen who used the road for movement of livestock and feed.
The Commission
had had another similar case a short time before
this hearing.
This earlier case involved the
closing of the station at St. John some 12 miles
In the hearing on
away from the Faust station.
the St. John case considerable evidence was introduced concerning the needs of the various sheepmen.
In disposing of the case involving the
closing of the Faust station. the Commission relied upon evidence which had been introduced in
the St. John case.
On certiorari this court held
that this was error.
\Ve said:
'The evidence
adduced in the St. John Station Case in this regard canriot be considered as evidence adduced
While the same counsel for the
in this case.
railroad may have appeared in both cases. and
the same witnesses testified for the railroad in both
yet the cross-examination which
cases,
the railroad counsel might direct in the Faust
case to the witnesses who appeared in the St.
John case, if they appeared in the Faust case,
might vary materially because of the new witThe
nesses who appeared in the Faust case.
Commission. like a jury, can consider such facts
in relation to evidence adduced which constitute
the common facts of life and which form the
common knowledge of mankind and can take·
judicial knowledge of such facts as a court may
take judicial notice of.
Such facts permit the

***
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fact finder to interpret evidence and articulate it
to the general facts of life.
The commission
may also, perhaps, take judicial notice of such
facts and practices as are generally known throughout the whole field of railroad transportation;
but it cannot take its special knovvledge
which it may have gained from experience or
from other hearings and base any findings or conclusions upon such knowledge.
That is fundamental.'
To the same effect see Spencer v.
Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 511, 20 P. 2d
618."

***

In Mulcahy, et al., v. Public Service Con1mission, et
al., 101 Utah 245, 117 P. 2d 298, the shoe vvas on the
other foot.
There a contract motor carrier between Salt
Lake City and points in Utah north of there applied in 1936
for a certificate of convenience and necessity to serve as a
common motor carrier in its territory, which application was, for
This decision vvas
all practical purposes, denied in 1937.
confirmed by the Supreme Court on December 5, 1939.
Prior to that final decision, and on October 13, 1939,
the contract motor carrier filed another application with the
commission for a certificate of convenience and necessity
as a common motor carrier covering the same territory as
was involved in the 1936 application.
The protestants
argued that the prior determination was res adjudicata in
the · second hearing and also argued that a transcript of the
evidence in the first hearing was erroneously rejected by the
commission at the second hearing because the conditions
were presumed to be the same until shown by the evidence
The court held that
in the second hearing to be different.
the first determination \vas not res adjudicata and that
since it was not there \vas no point in offering the transcript
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of evidence at the first hearing in the second hearing.
page 304 of 117 P. 2d. the court said:

At

·'It is evident therefore that there was no
legal controversy, no controversy at lavv, to call
into operation the exercise of the judicial function
or power. and the findings or conclusions made
would therefore not be a judicial determination
or judgment, and hence not res adjudicata. Furthermore Chapter 6 of Title 76. R.S.U. 1933,
provides that all hearings are governed by the
provisions of the chapter and the rules of practice
and procedure to be adopted by the Commission.
There is no provision in the chapter limiting the
number of times an application , can be made.
The Commission rule provides it may not be renewed \vithin one year, thus showing the Commission did not intend a rejection to be final.
· "Since the order on the 1937 application is
not res adjudicata, no point is involved in the
· refusal to receive in evidence the transcript of
evidence of that hearing.''
In the instant proceeding the applicants offered no
evidence from the hearing, as a result of which certificates
were issued to Gould. Collett, Cantlay & T anzola, and
Clark; and did not even offer in evidence the report of the
Commission in the Gould application, nor did the applicants
request the Commission to take judicial notice of conditions
existing at the time the certificates were issued nor vvas
there any suggestion that the conditions, insofar as the
public is concerned, were the same at the time of the
hearing in the original applications, at the time of the
orders issuing certificates to Gould. Collett, Clark, and
Cantlay & T anzola, or at the time of the hearing in this
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matter.
If the order was not res adjudicata in the
Mulcahy case, which involved the same parties and the
same territory, certainly the certificate of Gould is not res
adjudicata in this case of the issue of public convenience
and necessity.
And the defendants cannot be aided here on the
theory o-f a presumption of the continuing existence of a
condition requiring service to meet the public convenience
and necessity, if'. indeed, a presumption of such a matter
would ever be proper.
The protestants in this proceeding
disputed the existence of public convenience and necessity
by advising the Commission that it would have to be
proved ( R. 183- 184 ) · and proceeded to offer evidence
that the protestants could handle all of the business without Gould or Lang (R. 373-374, 523, 524)- and that
the present facilities and equipment of the protestants
were not being utilized (R. 358, 428, 492. 493). Certainly,
any presu1nption or inference that might be suggested vvas
rebutted. or at least dispelled by this evidence of protestants.
In the absence of a showing of public convenience
and necessity the certificate issued to Lang \Vas improvidently issued and it is not a sufficient answer that under
different circumstances and at a different time the Commission saw fit to grant a certificate to Gould ~n evidence
not now before the Commission or the Court and beyond
the power of these parties to question, limit or explain.
CONCLUSION
Certificates of Convenience and Necessity are personal
rif]hts, issued under the authority of the Stnte to those vvho
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can shovl that public convenience and necessity require
their services.
In Utah such certificates vvere once transThe la\v was changed and they
ferrable under the la\v.
are now transferrable only in the case of a deceased certificate holder and upon the approval of the Commission.
Applicant Lang is therefore entitled to a certificate of
convenience and necessity only upon making the showing
To permit Lang to tie onto Gould's
required by law.
operating authority is to permit transfer by calling , it a
The re-issue is a new certificate
cancellation and re-issue.
and should he issued only on a showing of publtc convenience and necessity.
The order of the Commission should be reversed and
set aside.
Respectfully submitted,
COLLETI TANK LINES
By Richards and Bird, Attorneys
CANTLAY & TANZOLA. INC.
By Lamoreaux and Tuft. Attorneys
CLARK TANKLINES COMPANY
By Callister, Callister and 1-Jewis,
Attorneys
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